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Abstract: Control is purposive or goal directed, hence, there are underlying drivers and 
consequences of the exercise of control modes and mechanisms. In response to recent 
empirical findings that cast doubts on the empowerment-control incompatibility thesis, the 
broader question of whether control is predominantly “controlling” or rather supportive in 
work environments is addressed. Drivers and consequences of control modes and 
mechanisms in five project teams involved in two ongoing construction projects in Hong 
Kong are explored. As an interpretive and exploratory study, a qualitative research design 
and the case study approach in particular was appropriate. Framework, category formation 
and cross-case analysis techniques were employed to analyse data collected through 
documentary analysis, passive observations and semi-structured face-to-face interviews. The 
exercise of control is driven by a range of factors emanating from the individual-, team-, 
organization- and project-level. Control modes and mechanisms also have performance 
related consequences for individuals, teams and organizations and are predominantly 
attributable to self-based control mechanisms. Preliminary evidence of the important link 
between self-control/empowerment and performance is therefore provided which is 
instructive for the performance improvement agenda in the construction industry. 
Keywords: empowerment, drivers of control, Hong Kong, consequences of control, portfolio 
of control 
 
   
INTRODUCTION 
It is in the nature of high risk undertakings, such as construction projects, to implement and 
use control mechanisms although they may not be visible to those being controlled 
(Badenfelt, 2007, Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Control mechanisms are 
particularly used in organisations to achieve goal congruence and reinforce corporate values 
and beliefs (Sisaye, 1998). The pervasive use of control mechanisms in construction project 
environments, however, appears to be at variance with the view that the site-based nature of 
projects with the attendant complexity and uncertainty provides an ideal climate for the 
empowerment of individuals and teams. Lack of empowerment of key project participants 
has, however, been cited as a problematic issue in successful partnering and other 
collaborative practices advocated for performance improvement in project contexts (c.f. Ng et 
al. 2002). Control has often been viewed as incommensurate with empowerment which 
emphasizes the expansion of employee autonomy and responsibility through the removal of 
control-oriented management approaches to create a work environment that permits 
employees to apply their full potential in the performance of tasks (Tuuli et al. in press).  Yet, 
recent empirical research (c.f. Lambe et al., 2009, Nieminen and Lehtonen, 2008, 
Dewettinck, 2004) cast doubts on the empowerment-control incompatibility thesis and 
suggest that both empowerment and control are valuable in optimizing the work context. 
Dewettinck (2004) for instance found that empowerment contributes to positive work 
outcomes through motivational mechanisms while the positive effects of control occur 
through mechanisms that lead to the fulfilment of employee’s basic need for competence 
development and challenging tasks. The interplay between control and empowerment and the 
underlying drivers of their use as well as the consequences that ensue therefore require 
further empirical exploration.  
 
   
The trajectory of control and empowerment research also appears to be shifting towards 
identifying the underlying values of exercising control and whether control is predominantly 
“controlling” (i.e. prescriptive of behaviours and outcomes) or rather supportive (i.e. enabling 
or facilitating) in nature (Adler and Borys, 1996, Dewettinck, 2004). In response to this 
focus, the aim of the study is to identify the drivers and consequences of the exercise of 
control modes and mechanisms in construction project teams. This is part of a larger research 
project exploring the manifestations of empowerment and control in project teams, findings 
from which have partially been reported by Tuuli and his colleagues (c.f. Tuuli, 2009, Tuuli 
et al., 2009, Tuuli et al., in press, Tuuli and Rowlinson, 2009). In the sections that follow, a 
framework of control modes is advanced to place the study in perspective and provide a 
reference for the identification of the drivers and consequences of the control modes. The 
research design is subsequently outlined and the findings from the analysis of the drivers and 
consequences of control in five project teams involved in two ongoing construction projects 
presented and discussed.  
DEVELOPMENT OF A CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
The organization and management literature views control as encompassing all the devices 
and systems employed to ensure that the behaviour and decisions of organizational 
constituents are consistent with the organization’s goals, objectives and strategies (Merchant 
and Stede, 2007, Flamholtz et al., 1985). Four modes of control have been advanced over the 
years, from the three originally proposed by Ouchi (1979), and account for the range of 
mechanisms (i.e. devices and systems) through which organizational control is exercised 
(Kirsch, 1996, Kirsch, 1997, Leifer and Mills, 1996, Nieminen and Lehtonen, 2008)- 
outcome-, behaviour-, clan- and self-based controls. Outcome- and behaviour-based controls 
are formal/bureaucratic control modes which attempt to restrict outcomes or behaviours 
 
   
while clan- and self-based controls depict informal control modes which attempt to induce a 
value or belief change (Flamholtz et al., 1985). Formal controls therefore rely on surveillance 
and close evaluation, build on the comparison of outcomes or behaviours with predetermined 
ones. Clan-based control relies on informal socialization, such as shared values, beliefs and 
norms, to eliminate goal incongruence. Self-based control is the scenario where one sets 
his/her own targets in relation to the needs of the organization or task, monitors his/her own 
behaviours and when necessary changes them in accordance with the self-set or agreed 
targets (Kirsch, 1996). Self-based control is therefore synonymous with the notion of 
empowerment. Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics of the four modes of control, as 
adapted from Nieminen and Lehtonen (2008), with additional information from prior studies 
(e.g. Eisenhardt, 1985, Kirsch, 1996, Kirsch, 1997, Leifer and Mills, 1996, Ouchi, 1979, 
Sharma, 1997), and provides an organizing framework for studying control in project teams. 
Control in this context is viewed as encompassing all the devices and systems employed to 
ensure that acts, behaviours, outcomes and decisions of individuals, teams and organizations 
are consistent with meeting organizational or project goals, objectives and strategies (c.f. 
Merchant and Stede, 2007, Flamholtz et al., 1985, Nieminen and Lehtonen, 2008).  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Recent empirical work in the project context (e.g. Badenfelt, 2007, Langfield-Smith, 2008, 
Nieminen and Lehtonen, 2008) have confirmed the four-modes of control framework 
described above and indeed, the existence of a portfolio of control modes comprising both 
formal and informal control mechanisms. What remains unknown, however, are the 
underlying drivers that determine the use of one mode of control or the other or a 
combination of modes of control and the consequences that ensue. In the information systems 
project management context, Kirsh (1997) identified task characteristics, knowledge and 
 
   
skills of the stakeholders and role expectations as key antecedents of control. However, no 
known study in the construction management domain has explored the dynamics of control 
and the underlying factors that engender the use control modes and mechanisms. An attempt 
is therefore made here to bridge this knowledge gap. Traditionally, contextual factors that 
determine control related concepts have been examined from three levels; individual-, team- 
and organization-level (Tuuli and Rowlinson, 2010). Recently, Kirsch (2004) also identified 
several factors influencing the choice of control modes from the project, stakeholder and 
global contexts. In the construction industry context in particular, project-level is an 
important source of drivers and it transcends the individual, team and the organisational 
contexts. The development of control theory is therefore best served by an expanded focus on 
the factors at all relevant levels that influence the use of control mechanisms.  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Design of the Study and Data Collection 
As an interpretive and exploratory study, a qualitative research design and the case study 
approach was particularly appropriate as it encompasses the holistic, in-depth study of a 
phenomenon using a variety of data sources and procedures (Yin, 2003). Two cases were 
selected for study; an infrastructure project and a building project. While the projects are 
comparable in some respects, consistent with an attempt at literal replication (c.f. Yin, 2003), 
they also differ in two key criteria; project lifecycle at start of case study and the project 
delivery/procurement system in use. These two characteristics have been shown to induce 
substantial variation in the authority, control and responsibility structures within the multi-
organizational project environment (c.f. Bryman et al., 1987, Newcombe, 1996, Rowlinson et 
al., 1993, Walker, 2002). The two projects therefore provided consistent, yet differentiated 
information rich settings for study that allowed the emergence and interplay of various other 
 
   
contextual factors. While the two projects were the primary focus of the study, the units of 
analysis were the five embedded project management teams of the contracting parties in the 
projects. 
Three data collection techniques were employed; documentary data analyses, observations 
and interviews. Documentary analysis was used to gain a deeper understanding of the 
projects and to identify project specific issues with control implications. Passive observations 
were undertaken at project meetings and site visits to capture authority, responsibility and 
control related issues in an emergent and emic manner. The interviews elicited information 
about manifestations (incidents) of control (covering the range of control modes as discussed 
and presented in Table 1) and the underlying drivers and consequences of the control modes. 
The Critical Incident Technique (c.f. Flanagan, 1954) was used to encourage respondents to 
recall control episodes on the project and to describe them in as much detail as possible. A 
total of 30 semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with carefully selected 
team members (17 on Project Alpha and 13 on Project Beta), carefully selected on the basis 
of their critical roles as either controllers or controlees. The interviewees role descriptions on 
the projects included project manager, site agent, quantity surveyor, quality control manager, 
project architect, resident engineer, project clerk of works, etc.. All but one interview were 
tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. By employing three different data sources, 
convergence of information was achieved through triangulation. In particular, inconsistencies 
in information from one source (e.g. interviews) were clarified using data from the other 
sources (e.g. documentary analysis or observations). Thus, collaborative evidence on 
pertinent issues was obtained from multiple sources to assert their credibility. 
 
 
   
Background of Projects and Teams 
Project Alpha 
The project involves the construction of a 1.1 km elevated viaduct which is an integral part of 
a 7.6 km long major highway infrastructure undertaking. The project is delivered under a 
traditional design-bid-build approach with a non-contractual partnering arrangement in place. 
The contract is a re-measurement type with a price fluctuation clause and awarded for an 
initial contract period of 40 months and at an initial contract sum of HK$1,012 million. There 
are three primary teams; the client’s team (i.e. Client-Alpha, 5 members of which 3 were 
interviewed), the consultant’s team (i.e. Consul-Alpha, 14 members of which 7 were 
interviewed) and the contractor’s team (i.e. Contra-Alpha, 10 members of which 7 were 
interviewed). The study of Project Alpha began about a year after the project started and 
lasted 30 months. 
The client is a government department with responsibility for the planning, design, 
construction and maintenance of the public road system and railway networks.  A team of 5 is 
assembled in-house to coordinate the client’s input into the project. The consulting engineer 
is a Hong Kong-based international engineering consulting firm with more than 60 years 
experience in the delivery of projects in the fields of building, civil engineering and industrial 
construction. Consul-Alpha team comprises The Engineer and a team of Resident Site Staff 
(RSS). The contractor is a joint venture between two Hong Kong-based French sister 
companies and a Chinese state-owned company. The companies brought together their 
enormous international expertise and local experience to forge a partnership.  
Project Beta 
The project is Phase 4 (of six phases) of a public-rental housing programme involving the 
construction of three 41-storey blocks, estimated to provide a total of about 2,300 units of 
 
   
rental apartments. The value of the works is estimated at about HK$434 million and is 
contracted out for an initial period of 36 months. The works are procured broadly under a 
traditional design-bid-build approach with a non-contractual partnering arrangement in place. 
Special conditions of contract cater for six work packages contracted under a Modified 
Guaranteed Maximum Price (MGMP) arrangement which collectively make-up about 31% of 
the contract sum. The study began slightly more than a year after the project started, and 
lasted 15 months. There are two primary teams in the project; the client’s team (i.e. Dual-
Beta, 15 members of which 6 were interviewed) and the contractor’s team (i.e. Contra-Beta, 
10 members of which 7 were interviewed).  
The client is a statutory body that develops and implements the government’s public housing 
programme. The project management team comprises head office staff and a site team who 
together play a dual role as both consultant and client, responding to design issues and 
making the approvals often reserved for the client’s team in a traditional project set-up. The 
contractor is part of a diversified conglomerate and plays a leading role in property 
development, construction and materials supply. Their choice as contractor for Project Beta 
was an assertion of their role as one of the leading contractors in the public housing market 
with a reputation of excellence and quality in housing delivery.  
Data Analysis Strategy 
The data was analysed in three stages. In the first stage, control mechanisms were identified 
and classified into the control modes framework as outlined in Table 1. The results of the first 
stage analysis are reported elsewhere by Tuuli and his colleagues (Tuuli et al, in press, Tuuli, 
2009, Tuuli et al., 2009). The second stage of the analyses identified the drivers of control 
from the detailed descriptions of the control mechanisms identified in stage one, the 
transcripts of interviews and notes from the documentary analysis and passive observations. 
 
   
Both explicit and implied reasons for the implementation of particular control mechanisms or 
the conditions that facilitated or fostered such implementation formed the basis of the driver 
identification. Here, category formation through “open coding”, i.e. applying conceptual 
labels (c.f. Corbin and Strauss, 2008), was used inductively to describe the identified drivers 
of control. Where the details of the drivers matched conceptual descriptions from literature, 
such labels were used (e.g. project complexity, organization culture, etc.), while other labels 
were suggested directly from the data itself (c.f. Corbin and Strauss, 2008). In a further step, 
the individual-, team-, project- and organization-level was used as the a priori framework to 
group the identified drivers of control. The third stage of the analyses process involved 
identifying consequences of the control modes and a similar process as that used to identify 
the drivers was employed. However, the identified consequences were classified into those 
for individuals, teams and organizations.  
Credibility and Trustworthiness Measures 
Credibility and trustworthiness are key issues in qualitative research and in case studies in 
particular. Demonstrating credibility and trustworthiness in the design and execution of 
qualitative research is particularly important in establishing confidence in the findings and 
conclusions drawn. Several measures were taken in the case studies and were mainly based 
on the recommendations of Butterfield et al. (2005); 
 Triangulation in the data collection: three sources of data were relied upon in each 
case study; documentary, observations and interviews. This enabled verification of 
emergent issues from multiple sources to achieve convergence. 
 Descriptive validity was ensured by working with verbatim transcripts of interviews, 
photocopied documentary evidence and notes and direct quotations as much as 
possible from the observations.  
 
   
 Interview fidelity was achieved through consistent application of the interview 
protocol but also probing as much as possible to discover the different perspectives of 
the interviewees.  
 Theoretical validity: This measure is demonstrated in the discussion of the case study 
findings, where references are made to previous research to show how the emergent 
themes from the cases are consistent or inconsistent. The aim therefore is to 
demonstrate theoretical agreement and convergence with previous work. 
 
FINDINGS 
Drivers of Control in Project Alpha 
Client-Alpha Team 
The drivers of control in Client-Alpha team are depicted in Table 2 (see column 5). Several 
of the drivers trigger multiple control modes. For example, organization culture which is 
characterised by “rule following” spurs procedures and standard setting (e.g. Project 
management handbook, project budget, etc. which are formal controls) while the constant 
reference to the organization’s mission statement is also attributable to the culture of 
accountability in the client’s organization (i.e. clan control). Some drivers, such as trust (i.e. 
within and across organizations) have a double-edged-sword effect. When trust exists, there 
is limited use of behaviour- and outcome-based controls but more clan controls are employed. 




   
Table 2 also depicts the drivers of the control modes in the Consul-Alpha team (see column 
5). There is no driver of control from the project-level. Trust, experience, organization rank 
and nationality & culture trigger multiple control modes and in some circumstances limit the 
use of behaviour- and outcome-based controls. Personality and top management support are 
key drivers of clan control modes. The following remarks of the Chief Engineer illustrates 
how personality influences the effective use of clan controls such as partnering and joint 
problem solving; 
“You see, work as a team is a slogan, right? But how to work as a team 
depends on many things, depends on personality, for example, for those 
individuals involved in the project, if some people have a strong character, 
they may not like to share with others and very often it will create frictions, 
right? That’s why in the workshops [partnering workshops] we always 
emphasize we have to be ‘hard on the issue but soft on the people’, so that 
people can be a bit open” 
Contra-Alpha Team 
The drivers of control modes in Contra-Alpha team are also shown in Table 2 (see column 5) 
and most of them are the same as those identified in both Client-Alpha and Consul-Alpha. 
Three drivers are, however, unique to Contra-Alpha; knowledge of past performance, project 
complexity and joint venture arrangement. While knowledge of past performance largely 
limits behaviour-based controls such as monitoring mechanisms, project complexity results in 
the introduction of several behaviour-based controls (e.g. operating guidelines on launching 
girder). Similarly, the contractor organization status as a joint venture triggers several 
controls, both formal and informal (e.g. Project Joint Venture Board, goal alignment, identity 
orientation, etc.) which otherwise would have been unnecessary. 
 
   
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Drivers of Control in Project Beta 
Dual-Beta Team 
Table 3 depicts the drivers of the different control modes in Dual-Beta team  and influence 
the use of multiple modes of control (see columns 4 and 5). For example, the 
pilot/experimental status of the project influences the use of the dispute resolution system to 
mitigate disputes (i.e. behaviour-based control). At the same time, this driver triggers a desire 
to succeed across the organization and had an impact on the selection of project team 
members while also arousing public interest in the project with the attendant pressure to 
succeed (i.e. clan controls). Also, while a driver such as trust leads to limited use of outcome-
based and behaviour-based control modes, these appear to have been replaced by clan control 
mechanisms. 
Contra-Beta Team 
Table 3 also shows the drivers of control in Contra-Beta team (see column 5). Most drivers 
trigger multiple modes of control. For example, the pilot/experimental status of the project 
triggers public pressure which is a form of clan control. At the same time, this driver creates 
the opportunity for the contractor’s involvement in design and enables the contractor to 
further role out Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives (i.e. self-control 
mechanisms). However, some drivers (e.g. status perception/expectation, open mindedness, 
etc.) influence the exercise of only self-control mechanisms. Also, other drivers (e.g. trust and 
knowledge of past performance) actually engender limited use of outcome-based and 
behaviour-based control mechanisms. Indirectly then, they appear to reinforce self-control 
through the belief that the contractor can be trusted to do the right thing through self-
 
   
regulation. This is manifested in the client’s attitude to control in situations where there is 
trust versus situations where little trust exists. The Senior Architect rationalizes this as 
follows; 
“I think with trust, …… if I give the instruction to the contractor, and I trust that 
they can do it…. according to what I want. …..I can simply give the order, and I 
know that it will be done. And this is the basic trust, right? But if I don’t trust him, 
well I should say, you should let me know the details how you are going to do it and 
I may have to be involved in the process as he is doing it. So I have to go to site and 
inspect the works, and maybe a few times, and modify some of the areas identified. 
If I trust him, I may not have to do this. So trust will decide how much involvement 
there will be in the implementation process.”  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Consequences of Control in Project Alpha 
Client-Alpha Team 
The exercise of control in Client-Alpha produced several as depicted in Table 4 (see column 
5). The relatively low number of claims and the apparently successful teamwork compared 
with the client’s other projects (e.g. adjoining projects) is attributed to a commitment to work 
together and jointly solve problems and the robustness of the contract. The client and 
individual project participants are also quite satisfied with the project so far. Indeed, this 
project is the only one in the client’s road programme that is on track to being delivered 
ahead of schedule. In terms of cost, it is projected that the out-turn cost will be up to 10% 
more than the cost at tender, due mainly to fluctuations, yet the client is still satisfied with 
that level of cost. Several control measures also yielded less non-compliance in Temporary 
Transport Arrangements (TTAs). There is also evidence of learning in Client-Alpha team. 
 
   
For several of the team members, this is the first project they have been involved in from 
inception and looking forward to taking it all the way to the close-out stage.  
Consul-Alpha Team 
The consequences of control in Consul-Alpha team are also depicted in Table 4 (see column 
5). Less claims and TTA non-compliance are consequences for organizations while teamwork 
is a consequence for both individuals and teams. The emergent consequences for individuals 
are learning and job satisfaction. Indeed, job satisfaction was one of the most recurrent 
themes in the interviews with Consul-Alpha team members. The comments of a Resident 
Engineer epitomise the pervasive feeling of satisfaction; 
“I find it quite satisfying in saying that the bridge is built and completed on 
time, without any accident. I think that’s the most rewarding part, no accident 
on the project being built at this high level [average height above ground is 
65m] is very important” 
Contra-Alpha Team 
The control modes in Contra-Alpha team had several consequences as also shown in Table 4 
(see column 5). Most of the consequences are the same as those identified in Client-Alpha 
and Consul-Alpha teams above. Creativity & innovation and time savings are, however, 
peculiar to Contra-Alpha team. The complex nature of the project was particularly the driver 
of the creative and innovative potential of the contractor. The consequences in Contra-Alpha 
where predominantly attributable to self-control mechanisms (see column 4 in Table 4). 




   
Consequences of Control in Project Beta 
Dual-Beta Team 
The exercise of control (i.e. mainly self-control) produced several consequences in Dual-Beta 
as shown in Table 5 (see column 5). For many Dual-Beta team members, several project 
characteristics present them with new experiences [e.g. GMP, Independent Checking Unit 
(ICU), use of precast elements, etc.] and, thus, there was a learning curve especially at the 
beginning of the project. The client is particularly satisfied with the progress being made and 
is optimistic. The contractor’s alternative design proposals as part of the MGMP packages 
(i.e. self-control mechanisms) have also yielded both time and cost savings. So far, two of 
such proposals (i.e. gabion wall to replace sheet piling and fibre glass railings in place of 
earthing for metal railings) have led to a net savings of about HK$1.5 million which have 
since been shared (50/50) between the contractor and the client. 
Contra-Beta Team 
The consequences of control identified in Contra-Beta team are attributable mainly to the 
exercise of several self-control mechanisms, as in Dual-Beta (see Table 5, columns 4 and 5). 
The MGMP packages and the ensuing contractor’s involvement in the design are seen as 
creating an opportunity to tap the contractor’s experience and expertise to improve 
buidability. This consequently unleashed the contractor’s creative and innovative potential as 
evident in the various alternative proposals that emerged, resulting in considerable time and 
cost savings. The success of the contractor’s CSR programmes in which the surrounding 
neighbours were engaged in the project is also evident in the comparatively less complaints 
received with regards to the works, a stack contrast with the experience in past projects.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
   
CROSS-TEAM COMPARISONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Drivers 
Control is purposive or goal directed (Kirsch, 1997), hence, there are underlying drivers of 
control modes and the mechanisms through which they are exercised in project teams. As the 
results show, control is driven by a range of factors emanating from the individual-, team-, 
organization- and project-level as discussed in detail below.  
Individual-level 
The individual-level drivers of control in the 5 teams across the two projects are summarized 
in the upper part of Table 6. No driver is common to all five teams; however, trust and 
experience are drivers of control in teams across both projects. While experience in Project 
Alpha was in relation to the project product and construction methods (i.e. RSS’s inadequate 
experience in precast viaduct bridges and segmental construction), in Project Beta, 
experience was in relation to the procurement arrangement. Both teams in Project Beta had 
no prior experience in the GMP arrangement. The experience scenarios in both projects 
required a learning curve to get up to speed and during this period more control was evident 
in some cases and completely absent in others. During this period, trust also played a key 
role. Where there was trust less monitoring was evident and vice versa (i.e. the double-edged-
sword effect referred to earlier). Some individual-level drivers, status perception and open 
mindedness, are specific to Contra-Beta team. Status perception is a driver for excellence 
over and above what is expected by the organization. Although open mindedness is an 
attribute of the Dual-Beta team, it is responsible for the emergence and sustenance of self-
control in Contra-Beta. In a traditional design-bid-build project arrangement, Dual-Beta 
team’s role would have been to provide the contractor with the designs to build. Due to the 
built in flexibility through the MGMP arrangement, however, the contractor was empowered 
 
   
to design and make alternative design proposals. An open mind was therefore imperative to 
the possibility of accepting and subsequently implementing such contractor’s proposed 
initiatives. 
Team-level 
Experience and trust are also team-level drivers of control as depicted in the second-quarter 
of Table 6. There is no team-level driver of control in Contra-Beta. In contrast to the 
individual-level manifestations of experience and trust, at the team-level the emphasis was to 
what extent the collective team experience or trust in the team as a whole triggers control. In 
terms of experience, the individual-level effect was similar to the team-level effect since there 
were no experienced individuals to make-up for the inexperience of other team members, 
thus, the teams in both projects had to go through the learning curve. In the case of trust, 
however, there is evidence that more trustworthy team members in both projects provided a 
bridge for new team members whose credibility was yet to be ascertained. Thus, when an 
issue arose, the presence or involvement of more trustworthy team members was sufficient 
for the team to be considered trustworthy as well, resulting in less control. However, trust 
manifested as a double-edged-sword in both projects where its presence limited behaviour- 
and outcome-based controls but resulted in the increase of clan controls and vice versa. 
Organization-level 
The organization-level drivers of control across the 5 teams are also shown in the third-
quarter of Table 6. Top management support is a driver of control in all teams. However, its 
manifestation and the control modes it triggers differ in the two projects. In Project Alpha, 
top management support manifests as top management articulation of desire to work in 
partnership with other parties to jointly solve project problems. This call resonated 
consistently across all the teams in Project Alpha and is a key driver of clan control 
 
   
mechanisms such as partnering, joint problem solving and mutual objectives. In Project Beta, 
however, top management support manifests in top management provision of additional 
resources and the affordance of greater leverage for the site team to test and develop ideas. 
Support in Project Beta therefore encourages proactive attitude, thus, a driver of self-control. 
Organization culture is also a common driver across teams in both projects and its effects in 
the client related teams is similar. As teams from government departments, both teams were 
influenced by a bureaucratic culture. However, the influence of organization culture on 
controls in Client-Alpha is more pervasive than on controls in Dual-Beta. A plausible 
explanation for the different influence of organization culture in the two teams may stem 
from the division of the client’s organization that Dual-Beta team originates and the fact that 
the team plays a dual role as client and designer. As the R & D section, the Development and 
Procurement Sub-division has been in the forefront of the client’s innovative initiatives. A 
culture of proactivity seems to have been built into the way things are done, cultivated 
through the supportive nature of the organizational environment. As Table 5 also shows, 
some drivers are team specific, reflecting the peculiar team or organization circumstances. 
The joint venture origins of Contra-Alpha and the R & D origins of Dual-Beta are the most 
prominent of such team or organization specific circumstances. 
Project-level 
The project-level drivers of control are also shown in the bottom of Table 6. Project status 
and complexity are drivers in teams across both teams. There are similarities and differences 
in their manifestations and the controls they trigger. In Project Alpha, project status is a 
function of the importance and priority of the project to the client and, thus, triggers more 
reporting to the client’s top management who wanted to stay informed on all relevant issues 
on the project. Project Beta on the other hand is an experimental/pilot project. Its 
experimental/pilot status and initiatives such as the MGMP packages triggered public interest 
 
   
with the consequences being pressure on the project team to succeed. An “open book 
accounting” approach was also instituted to help monitor cost. INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Consequences 
The findings show that the exercise of control in its diverse forms is associated with several 
consequences for individuals, teams and organizations as discussed in further detail below. 
For Individuals 
Table 7 (i.e. upper part) depicts the consequences of control for individuals across the two 
projects.  Job satisfaction and learning manifest in all teams and are primarily attributed to 
various self-control mechanisms. There is, however, an interesting distinction in the teams 
regarding how control leads to both job satisfaction and learning. In Client-Alpha and 
Consul-Alpha teams, job satisfaction and learning are a result of mainly self-control 
mechanisms exercised by Contra-Alpha and not from the self-control of Client-Alpha or 
Consul-Alpha teams themselves. Job satisfaction and learning in Contra-Alpha, Dual-Beta 
and Contra-Beta teams, however, emerge from their own self-control mechanisms. There are 
also team specific consequences in Contra-Beta team; opportunity and creativity & 
innovation. These outcomes are also a direct result of self-control mechanisms, especially the 
MGMP arrangement with the resultant opportunity for involvement in design that also allows 
individuals to suggest ideas.  
For Teams 
The consequences of control for teams across the five teams are also shown in Table 7 (i.e. 
middle part). All the consequences for teams are project specific and attributable to different 
control modes. Teamwork, which is specific to Project Alpha, is a consequence of clan 
control mechanisms while learning, specific to Project Beta, is primarily an outcome of self-
control mechanisms. However, mutual understanding which is specific to Contra-beta team is 
 
   
attributable to behaviour-based control mechanisms. In this regard, handbooks and manuals 
are seen as a means of obtaining mutual understanding among the team members on what 
direction or procedure to pursue under different project scenarios. While learning, 
opportunity and creativity and innovation for teams are similar to the consequences for 
individuals, here the emphasis is on what was learnt as a team, what opportunities are created 
for teams and the overall pattern of creative & innovative behaviours enacted by teams.  
For Organizations 
The consequences of control for organizations are also depicted in Table 7 (i.e. bottom part). 
Taken together, there are comparatively more consequences for organizations than 
consequences for teams and individuals. Three consequences, client satisfaction, creativity & 
innovation and time savings, are common outcomes in both projects (i.e. Project Alpha and 
Beta). The majority of the consequences of control for organizations are, however, project 
specific. For example, less claims & non-compliance and teamwork are specific to Project 
Alpha while cost savings, learning, opportunity and less public complaints are specific to 
Project Beta. Almost all the consequences of control in Project Beta are attributable to self-
control mechanisms. This is interesting, considering that there are comparatively more 
behaviour-, outcome- and clan-based control mechanisms in Project Beta than self-based 
control mechanisms. On the contrary, while some consequences of control in Project Alpha 
are attributable to single modes of control (i.e. mainly clan and self-control mechanisms), 
other consequences are the outcome of multiple modes of control (i.e. mainly a combination 
of behaviour-based and self-control). 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
   
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
There are underlying drivers and consequences of the exercise of control modes and 
mechanisms in project teams. A set of drivers emanating from the individual-, team-, 
organization- and project-level were identified and shown to: (a) depend on project or team 
specific circumstances; (b) trigger different control modes in different projects or teams 
depending on the nature of their manifestation; (c) trigger multiple control modes; and (d) 
have “double-edged-sword” effects in the manner in which they influence control modes. A 
greater insight into the previously unexplored area of drivers of control in construction 
project context is provided which suggests that project participants and sponsors must 
recognize that peculiar project and team conditions may warrant the development and 
implementation of team or project specific control mechanisms.  Also, drivers are not 
necessarily associated with particular control modes; hence, the manifestation of a driver may 
provide a better clue to the control mode it engenders. The link between specific drivers and 
particular modes of control is therefore complex and requires more systematic examination. 
Further, the “double-edged-sword” effects of some drivers, especially trust, experience and 
knowledge of past performance, suggest that some drivers can promote the exercise of 
control in very subtle ways that may not be recognised by those being controlled (c.f. 
Badenfelt, 2007, Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Thus, the mere reduction in 
or perceived absence of formal controls may not necessarily signal that other forms of control 
are not present.  
The control modes and mechanisms also have consequences for individuals, teams and 
organizations. Notably, the outcomes of control are predominantly attributable to self-control 
mechanisms.  Whether this is really the case or, as Nieminen and Lehtonen (2008) suggest, 
that formal controls become so innate that they are no longer viewed as controls and hence, 
 
   
as having consequences is unclear. Perrow (1986) has also earlier pointed out that 
organizational constituents resent “bad” rules, but take for granted or barely notice “good” 
rules. On the evidence of the identified consequences in the case studies and their link to 
control modes, self-control clearly emerges as an important driver in engendering positive 
outcomes for individuals, teams and organizations. This echoes prior findings of the 
productive nature of self-regulation/empowerment and its appropriateness in complex and 
uncertain work settings such as construction (c.f. Kanter, 1977, Greasley et al., 2005, 
Langfred, 2000, Loosemore et al., 2003).  
 
The consequences of control for individuals, teams or organizations are also predominantly 
performance related (e.g. satisfaction, learning, opportunity, creativity and innovation, 
teamwork, etc.). This is an interesting finding in view of the fact that these outcomes are 
predominantly the result of self-control/empowerment. Indeed, the perceived performance 
consequences of self-control/empowerment has a long history and it remains a key 
presumption of empowerment theory that empowered individuals and teams perform better 
than those relatively less empowered (c.f. Thomas and Velthouse, 1990, Kirkman and Rosen, 
1997, Kirkman and Rosen, 1999, Tuuli, 2009, Tuuli and Rowlinson, 2009). It is particularly 
remarkable that the performance consequences of self-control are not only for individuals, 
but teams and organizations as well. Self-control may therefore have greater implications for 
the performance improvement agenda in the construction industry. Cost, time, teamwork and 
public complaints are areas the construction industry has consistently underperformed but 
which, as the findings here suggests, could benefit from individual, team and organization 
self-control in project settings. There is therefore preliminary evidence of the important link 
between self-control/empowerment and performance which provide support for the adoption 
 
   
of empowerment within the construction industry as a key to the industry’s performance 
improvement drive (c.f. M4I, 2000, Nesan and Holt, 1999).  
 
It is also instructive that some of the positive consequences were attributed to behaviour-, 
outcome- and clan-based control mechanisms while no negative consequences arising from 
them was evident. This suggests that the form of control exercised in the teams examined 
may not have debilitating effects as some have surmised (e.g. Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006, 
Fournier and Grey, 2000, Hodgson, 2004). In accord with the earlier findings of Dewettinck 
(2004) therefore both control and empowerment contribute positively to work outcomes, 
especially where there is coherence and no obvious conflict among the different control 
modes (Nieminen and Lehtonen, 2008). 
 Caution should, however, be exercised in interpreting the findings of this study because of 
their case specific nature and the possibility of self-serving attribution bias, which manifests 
itself in the tendency to take credit for successes and blame others for failure (Bradley, 1978, 
Miller and Ross, 1975). By not concurrently assessing respondents’ perceived level of self-
control/empowerment, we were unable to test whether respondents less empowered made 
external attributions of negative consequences or whether those more empowered made 
internal attributions regarding the positive consequences identified.  
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Table 1: Conceptual Framework of Control Modes and Control Mechanisms 
Characteristics 
Formal/Bureaucratic Control  Informal Control 
Outcome-based  Behaviour-based   Clan-based  Self-based 




 Values, beliefs Self-regulation 




 Shared values, shared 
norms 
Self-monitoring 














































Codes of conduct, 
contracts, 
handbooks, etc. 
 Mission statement, core 






Source: Adapted from Nieminen and Lehtonen (2008) 
 
   
 
Table 2: Drivers of Modes of Control in Project Alpha 
Driver Descriptions  Driver Level Control Mode Team 
Nationality & Culture Multiple nationalities and cultural backgrounds created a sense of cultural 
awareness resulting in adjustment of acceptable behaviours, 
communication, personality and attitudes. 
Individual Clan-/Behaviour-based Client/Consul
/Contra 
Top Management Support Articulation of desire to work in partnership with other parties to jointly 
solve project problems. 
Organization Clan-based Client/Consul
/Contra 











Trust-Consul-Alpha Senior management had hands-off approach and importance placed on 




Trust-Contra-Alpha Trust was fundamental in the joint venture and manifested in the partners 
finding no need to introduce any extra controls or surveillance to protect 
their interest. There was also articulation of strong belief that everyone was 






Project Status Project is part of a high profile road programme requiring more attention. Project Behaviour-based  Client 
Personality Strong, protective and dominant personalities and apathetic behaviours 
often seen as a threat to partnering and teamwork were absent. 
Individual Clan-based Client/Consul
/Contra 
Organization Culture The organization emphasizes accountability and transparency. Fear of 




Lack of Experience  The Resident Site Staff (RSS) team had inadequate experience in precast 





Organization Rank Higher rank personnel (e.g. Chief Resident Engineer, The Engineer, etc.) 
were seen as having greater opportunities to exercise authority granted 
through the contract or the organization. 
Individual Behaviour-/Outcome-/ 
Clan-/Self- based  
Consul/Contr
a 
Knowledge of Past 
Performance 
The joint venture partner contractors have a long working experience with 
both the client and consultant. 
Organization Behaviour-based  Contra 
Project Complexity There are peculiar features of the project that made it a complex 
undertaking; size, location (vertically and laterally), technical requirements, 
heavy precast elements, curvature of viaducts, number of bridges (i.e. 21 in 
total), extensive work at height, etc. 
Project Outcome- / Behaviour-
based  
Contra 
Joint Venture The risk of self-interest because of the joint venture status of the contractor 





   
 
Table 3: Drivers of Modes of Control in Project Beta 
Driver  Descriptions Driver Level Control Mode Team 
Trust-Dual-Beta Team There was mutual understanding and communication which resulted in 
more proactive attitudes. 
Individual Clan/Self-based Dual 
Organization Culture Fear of blame or prosecution drives a “rule following culture”, which 









Experience with GMP 
Arrangement 
The GMP arrangement was new to both the client and contractor. Thus, 
they were both very cautious in their approach. 
Individual/Team/ 
Organization 
Behaviour-based  Dual/Contra 
Top Management Support The team was afforded flexibility to test ideas and there was willingness 
to consider proposals from the team. 
Organization Self-based Dual/Contra 
Procurement Arrangement The introduction of GMP to an otherwise traditional design-bid-build 
contract, introduced elements of design and built in the form of the 





Trust-Client Trust manifests itself in less documentation (e.g. letters), monitoring and 




Project Complexity Project was a site specific design compared with the standard block 
design the client has often used. There were also contractor’s proposed 




Knowledge of Past Performance The contractor has a long working experience with the client which 
increased trust. 
Organization Behaviour-based  Contra
Status Perception/ 
Expectation 
Project leader is a Senior Project Manager/Assistant General Manager 
compared with the other project leaders in the company who are just 
Project Managers.  
Individual Self-based Contra
Open Mindedness Given the atypical nature of the project, there was adjustment in attitude 
to be more open to suggestions and proposals. 
Individual Self-based Contra
Risk Perception Potential risk of failure was a constraint to greater self-control. Organization Self-based Contra
Project Implementation Division  The Development and Procurement (R & D) Sub-division had no prior 









   
 
Table 4: Consequences of Modes of Control in Project Alpha 
Consequences Descriptions Consequences for Control Mode Team 
Less Claims Claims on the project are primarily due to inclement weather (i.e. 65% of 
notified claims).  
Organizations Clan Control Client/Consul/
Contra 
Client Satisfaction The client is generally satisfied with the project so far especially in terms of 




Less TTA Non-compliance This project has experienced less total non-compliance in Temporary Transport 
Arrangements (TTA) than most of the client’s projects. This is attributed to 





Job Satisfaction There were expressions of how enjoyable, interesting, satisfying and personally 
rewarding it is to be part of the construction of a landmark edifice and seeing it 
on tract to be delivered on time and without any serious accident. 
Individuals Self-based Client/Consul/
Contra 
Learning The project created an opportunity for several individuals to go through the 
project lifecycle for the first time and expand their knowledge base. The 
innovative initiatives were also an opportunity to learn (e.g. the use of the new 
generation launching girder). 
Individuals Self-based Client/Consul/
Contra 
Teamwork Teamwork manifested itself in the mutual understanding, joint problem solving 





Creativity and Innovation The complex and technically challenging nature of the project provided an 
opportunity for the contractor to propose alternative designs and methods of 
construction resulting in considerable time & cost savings. 
Organizations Self-based Contra 
Time Savings Contractor’s innovative construction methods resulted in considerable savings 
in time. 








   
 
Table 5: Consequences of Modes of Control in Dual-Beta Team 
Consequences Typical Manifestations Consequences for Control Mode Team 
Cost Savings Contractor’s innovative proposals resulted in cost savings that were shared 
equally between the client and contractor. 
Organizations Self-based Dual/Contra 
Time Savings Contractor’s innovative proposals resulted in considerable savings in time 
which will lead to early occupancy for tenants. 
Organizations Self-based Dual/Contra 
Learning There is evidence of learning at the individual-, team- and organization-
level. Learning was in terms of ICU procedures, GMP arrangement, 






Job Satisfaction This manifested in expressions of how enjoyable the project experience 
was and seeing suggested ideas actually being used on a live project. 
Individuals Self-based Dual/Contra 
Client Satisfaction The client in general is satisfied with the process so far. The client is also 
happy with the contractor’s performance so far.   
Organization Self-based Dual
Mutual Understanding Management systems, manuals and handbooks were viewed as a means of 
providing clear directions to all team members in terms of role 
expectations. 
Teams Behaviour-based Contra 
Opportunity The contractor had the opportunity to propose alternative designs in what 
otherwise is a traditional procurement arrangement. This trickled down 





Less Public Complaints This project experienced considerably much less public complaints 
compared with similar past projects. This was attributed to the contractors 
CSR initiatives, especially the public engagement. 
Organizations Self-control Contra
Creativity and Innovation The opportunity provided for involvement in alternative proposal (e.g. 
design) unleashed the creative and innovative ideas of the contractor and 






   
 
Table 6: Cross-Team Comparison of Drivers of Control 
Drivers 
Project Alpha  Project Beta 
Client Consul Contra  Dual Contra 
Individual-level       
Experience  (i.e. type of project)  √ √  √  
Nationality & Culture √ √ √    
Trust (across organization) √ √ √    
Trust (within organization) √ √ √  √  
Organization Rank  √ √    
Personality √ √ √    
Status Perception/Expectation      √ 
Open Mindedness      √ 
       
Team-level       
Experience  (i.e. type of project)  √   √  
Trust (across organization) √ √ √    
       
Organization-level       
Top Management Support √ √ √  √ √ 
Trust (across organization) √ √ √    
Organization Culture √    √  
Knowledge of Past Performance   √   √ 
Joint Venture   √    
Experience  (i.e. type of project)     √ √ 
Risk Perception      √ 
Project Implementation Division      √ 
       
Project-level       
Project Status (i.e. experiment/priority) √    √ √ 
Project Complexity   √   √ 
Procurement Arrangement     √ √ 











   
 
Table 7: Cross-Team Comparison of Consequences of Control 
Consequences 
Project Alpha  Project Beta 
Client Consul Contra  Dual Contra 
Individuals       
Job Satisfaction √ √ √  √ √ 
Learning √ √ √  √ √ 
Opportunity      √ 
Creativity and Innovation   √   √ 
       
Teams       
Teamwork √ √ √    
Learning     √ √ 
Mutual Understanding      √ 
Opportunity      √ 
Creativity and Innovation      √ 
       
Organizations       
Less Claims √ √ √    
Client Satisfaction √    √  
Less TTA Non-compliance √ √ √    
Teamwork √ √ √    
Creativity and Innovation   √   √ 
Time Savings   √  √ √ 
Cost Savings     √ √ 
Learning     √ √ 
Opportunity      √ 
Less Public Complaints      √ 
Notes: aAn “√” under any team indicates the outcome manifested itself in the team. 
